Then They Ceased Fire
The cease fire in Lebanon seems to be effective, at least for now. That's the good news.
Not all details of the UN cease fire resolution (1701) are still alive; e.g. disarming of Hizbullah seems to be off the agenda. France is reluctant to assume the leading role in the multinational force intended earlier, at least not until clearer rules of engagement are in place.
Meanwhile the regular army of Lebanon has been moving beyond the Litani river up to the international border, as the Israeli army (Tzahal) withdrew beyond. Let me correct here a general impression that the Lebanese army never invaded the State of Israel. The 11th batallion of the Oded brigade, in which I served (three months later), suffered substantial casualties when that army suddenly attacked at Malkiah (south of where Kiryat Shmonah is now) just a few days after the Israeli independence proclamation. They were dislodged with more heavy casualties of units of the Palmakh. Besides that, the Lebanese army did not fight the Israeli one (as far as I know).
In Israel the battle of interpretation is heating up. Who is to take the blame for what is generally considered to have been a failure. There is still a residual attempt to proclaim victory, especially at the supra-Israeli (George W. Bush) level, and steps to make it appear so should be expected to follow. Not only have none of the original objectives been achieved, notably the release of the abducted soldiers; what is viewed as far worse is the loss of Israel's overwhelming military deterrance power. That could encourage hostile armies like the Syrian (if they also miscalculate) to try for their own victory. Again far worse in many Israeli eyes is the loss of utility value to U.S. strategists.
Hizbullah will be viewed as the victor in the Muslim world and, at least in the short run, within Lebanon and elsewhere, including Israel. Many returning Israeli soldiers have expressed respect for their fighting spirit. They are now already busy handing out generous cash payments to people whose homes have been destroyed; which should help prevent later accusations that their provocation caused the Israeli response and destruction of their homes. Surely to the dismay of (at least) leaders of other Lebanese factions, Hassan Nasrollah, Hizbullah's leader, is widely hailed as the new Nasser, even the new Salah ad Din; with his image everywhere in the otherwise pretty strictly monotheistic Moslem world.
Since I wrote the above about the effectiveness of the cease fire, the first violation by an Israeli commando operation near Baalbek was condemned by the UN's Kofi Annan, and called justified by the Israeli government. If you hoped that the negotiations for the exchange of prisoners may provide an opportunity for a start of wider real peace talks, all the Israeli talk of how it has to be done better next time is not good news. There evidently are also more voices of wisdom (courage) calling for an end to ever more useless and ruinous military victories and some victory for peaceful resolution. But any changes in political leadership and direction are likely to be toward the more militarist ultraright. Netanyahu already reemerged during the fighting. The best hope may be that George W. Bush will decide on a change of course in this, and he likes to stay it.
Uri Avneri has condemned what I had termed "the stupid slaughter" between adoption of UN Resolution 1707 and effectiveness (end of preceding posting) in more severe terms: "a cynical - not to say vile - exercise". This old early pioneer in standing up to the abandonment (or betrayal) of what the Hebrew state was supposed to be about is no longer a lone prominent voice crying in a wilderness; but it clearly still requires courage.
Not all details of the UN cease fire resolution (1701) are still alive; e.g. disarming of Hizbullah seems to be off the agenda. France is reluctant to assume the leading role in the multinational force intended earlier, at least not until clearer rules of engagement are in place.
Meanwhile the regular army of Lebanon has been moving beyond the Litani river up to the international border, as the Israeli army (Tzahal) withdrew beyond. Let me correct here a general impression that the Lebanese army never invaded the State of Israel. The 11th batallion of the Oded brigade, in which I served (three months later), suffered substantial casualties when that army suddenly attacked at Malkiah (south of where Kiryat Shmonah is now) just a few days after the Israeli independence proclamation. They were dislodged with more heavy casualties of units of the Palmakh. Besides that, the Lebanese army did not fight the Israeli one (as far as I know).
In Israel the battle of interpretation is heating up. Who is to take the blame for what is generally considered to have been a failure. There is still a residual attempt to proclaim victory, especially at the supra-Israeli (George W. Bush) level, and steps to make it appear so should be expected to follow. Not only have none of the original objectives been achieved, notably the release of the abducted soldiers; what is viewed as far worse is the loss of Israel's overwhelming military deterrance power. That could encourage hostile armies like the Syrian (if they also miscalculate) to try for their own victory. Again far worse in many Israeli eyes is the loss of utility value to U.S. strategists.
Hizbullah will be viewed as the victor in the Muslim world and, at least in the short run, within Lebanon and elsewhere, including Israel. Many returning Israeli soldiers have expressed respect for their fighting spirit. They are now already busy handing out generous cash payments to people whose homes have been destroyed; which should help prevent later accusations that their provocation caused the Israeli response and destruction of their homes. Surely to the dismay of (at least) leaders of other Lebanese factions, Hassan Nasrollah, Hizbullah's leader, is widely hailed as the new Nasser, even the new Salah ad Din; with his image everywhere in the otherwise pretty strictly monotheistic Moslem world.
Since I wrote the above about the effectiveness of the cease fire, the first violation by an Israeli commando operation near Baalbek was condemned by the UN's Kofi Annan, and called justified by the Israeli government. If you hoped that the negotiations for the exchange of prisoners may provide an opportunity for a start of wider real peace talks, all the Israeli talk of how it has to be done better next time is not good news. There evidently are also more voices of wisdom (courage) calling for an end to ever more useless and ruinous military victories and some victory for peaceful resolution. But any changes in political leadership and direction are likely to be toward the more militarist ultraright. Netanyahu already reemerged during the fighting. The best hope may be that George W. Bush will decide on a change of course in this, and he likes to stay it.
Uri Avneri has condemned what I had termed "the stupid slaughter" between adoption of UN Resolution 1707 and effectiveness (end of preceding posting) in more severe terms: "a cynical - not to say vile - exercise". This old early pioneer in standing up to the abandonment (or betrayal) of what the Hebrew state was supposed to be about is no longer a lone prominent voice crying in a wilderness; but it clearly still requires courage.
posted by solar_sol | 9:06 PM
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